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Authentication plays an important role in how we interact with computers,
mobile devices, the web, etc. The idea of authentication is to uniquely identify a
user before granting access to system privileges. For example, in recent years more
corporate information and applications have been accessible via the Internet and
Intranet. Many employees are working from remote locations and need access to
secure corporate files. During this time, it is possible for malicious or unauthorized
users to gain access to the system. For this reason, it is logical to have some
mechanism in place to detect whether the logged-in user is the same user in control
of the user’s session. Therefore, highly secure authentication methods must be used.
We posit that each of us is unique in our use of computer systems. It is this
uniqueness that is leveraged to “continuously authenticate users” while they use
web software. To monitor user behavior, n-gram models are used to capture user
interactions with web-based software. This statistical language model essentially
captures sequences and sub-sequences of user actions, their orderings, and temporal
relationships that make them unique by providing a model of how each user typically
behaves. Users are then continuously monitored during software operations. Large
deviations from “normal behavior” can possibly indicate malicious or unintended
behavior. This approach is implemented in a system called Intruder Detector (ID)
that models user actions as embodied in web logs generated in response to a user’s
actions. User identification through web logs is cost-effective and non-intrusive.
We perform experiments on a large fielded system with web logs of approximately
4000 users. For these experiments, we use two classification techniques; binary and
multi-class classification.
We evaluate model-specific differences of user behavior based on coarse-grain
(i.e., role) and fine-grain (i.e., individual) analysis. A specific set of metrics are
used to provide valuable insight into how each model performs. Intruder Detector
achieves accurate results when identifying legitimate users and user types. This tool
is also able to detect outliers in role-based user behavior with optimal performance.
In addition to web applications, this continuous monitoring technique can be used
with other user-based systems such as mobile devices and the analysis of network
traffic.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Many web-based applications rely on authentication methods that are reliable, con-
venient and secure. Username and password have been universally accepted by most
applications to be the only form of authentication. Some systems require the use
of long passwords that need to be changed frequently. They can be difficult to
remember, create, and manage [1]. In addition to long passwords, passwords that
are too short or lack complexity also pose a significant risk. In a study of over
3.3 million leaked passwords from North America and Western Europe, SplashData
records “123456” and “password” as the top two passwords chosen by users [2].
Conventional authentication methods do not ask the user to verify their iden-
tity during their active log-in session, leaving the computer system vulnerable to
malicious or unintended use while the user is logged-in [3]. To improve the au-
thentication process for web-based applications, there must be a method to continu-
ously verify the identity of a user. Continuous User Authentication (CUA) has been
proven to solve this limitation. CUA techniques monitor, verify, and authenticate
users during their entire session. CUA generates user profiles and compares them to
the user’s stored profile. If user activity deviates from its normal pattern of usage,
the system generates an alarm. CUA systems have user profiles that are customized
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for every application. This makes it difficult for attackers to know which actions
will be detected as intrusive [4].
Several studies have used biometrics to continuously authenticate users by the
use of cognitive fingerprints, eye scans, color of user’s clothing, and face tracking [3]
[5] [6]. However, many of these techniques require additional hardware and cost to
operate efficiently. Behavioral modeling addresses these limitations by monitoring
how users interact with the system. Evaluating mouse movement, how users search
for and select information, and the habitual typing rhythm of users are measures
used to continuously observe a user’s behavior [7][8]. Although these approaches
do not require special hardware, most of them require the installation of specialized
monitoring software.
This research addresses challenges that occur when modeling the behavior of
users that interact with web-based organizational information system applications.
These applications run inside a Web browser-based front-end and are accessible via
hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP). It also includes middleware to implement busi-
ness logic and a back-end database. We categorize information system as organized
systems for the collection, organization, communication and storage of information
[9]. We develop a new tool, Intruder Detector (ID), to model unique behavioral foot-
prints for each user. Patterns of use for a specific user or group of users is captured
in this footprint and leveraged to “continuously” authenticate the user. ID performs
behavioral analysis for each user and builds a context of each user’s behavior, based
on a statistical language model, to verify the user’s identity. No additional hardware
is required to deploy this tool. Furthermore, we seek to provide a cost-effective and
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non-intrusive solution for web-based user authentication. Our preliminary work for
this research received the Best Paper Award at the Eighth International Conference
on Emerging Security Information, Systems, and Technologies [10].
We provide the following contributions from this research:
• We develop a novel keyword abstraction technique to pre-process large volumes
of web logs by eliminating incomplete, noisy and inconsistent data.
• We use statistical language models to capture the behavior of users while they
interact with organizational web-based applications.
• We develop a continuous user authentication framework with the ability to
categorize user sessions into a predefined set of roles or finer-grained user
profiles. This framework is also used to identify outliers in role-based user
behavior.
• We introduce a set of evaluation metrics to test the feasibility of our approach.
1.1 Continuous User Authentication Scenarios
This research explores how modeling user behavior affects system security and us-
ability when using data that is already available (e.g., web server logs). The following
two scenarios show how CUA may be used in typical settings.
Scenario 1: Alice uses her laptop to telework from a local coffee shop. She
uses her web browser to login to her corporate site and perform her daily tasks.
As she steps away from her laptop to get a refill of coffee, an unauthorized person
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accesses her laptop to perform actions on the corporate site, maliciously merging
and changing sensitive records. Unbeknownst to the “intruder,” the web-site is
equipped with our CUA system, called Intruder Detector, that automatically detects
deviations from normal behavior and subsequently locks her computer. ID works
as follows: It monitors all user actions and builds, for each user, an n-gram model1,
a mathematical representation of how the user typically interacts with the web
application. ID determines, in real time, whether the user is deviating from expected
behavior, signaling the possible presence of an intruder. Because this instance of
ID is based solely on analysis of web logs, it is extremely fast and it requires no
special hardware or changes to the web application.
Scenario 2: Bob’s office computer is used to perform illegal transactions via
the company’s web application. Because the computer is located in a “secure”
area, the forensics team concludes that the malicious transactions must have been
done by a co-worker. They retrieve the system’s web access logs and filter out
those that originated from Bob’s computer, thereby obtaining all the web requests
between Bob’s computer and the web server. They then use these logs and the
models stored in ID, which represent exactly how each user typically behaves when
using the web application, to pinpoint the co-worker who most closely resembles the
pattern of unauthorized accesses. In this scenario, there is some level of uncertainty
because the malicious sequences by the intruder may or may not match their stored
user model. At this point, ID is simply one tool in the investigative process and
1An n-gram representation models sequences using the statistical properties of n-grams (con-
tiguous sequences of n items/actions).
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additional forensic data is needed to pinpoint the person performing the malicious
transactions.
1.2 Thesis Statement
This work aims to obtain a unique behavioral footprint indicating patterns of use
for specific users or group of users of a web-based organizational information system
application using information that is naturally generated by the system (e.g., web
logs). Models are then constructed for any targeted group of sessions based on n-
grams. By leveraging this footprint, users are “continuously” authenticated. This
leads to the following thesis statement:
Sequences and subsequences of user action that is obtained from web log files
can be captured within statistical language models to continuously authenticate users
of web-based organizational information system applications.
1.3 Approach
To prove the above thesis statement, we analyze how log data from web-based
applications can be used to predict user behavior. Web server logs capture all
requests made to the server. For many systems, web server log files are not fully
utilized. These logs, also called access logs, include historical information about the
activities performed by users. There are several ways web server logs can be used to
present valuable information to a system administrator. For example, information
extracted from log files have been used by companies to provide better service to
5
customers and improve the quality of their website.
In addition to improving user interaction, web logs can be used to trace pat-
terns of behavior. The patterns can then be used with statistical language models,
such as n-grams, to predict user behavior. n-gram models have performed surpris-
ingly well in the domain of natural language processing (NLP), where researchers
have found that a history of only one to two events is necessary to obtain opti-
mal predictive capabilities [11]. An n-gram model captures all sequences of a fixed
length, N , from previously observed user input, which allows prediction and evalu-
ation of future behavior based on frequencies. In the realm of NLP, these sequences
are words generated for sentences. Web-based user actions also have a grammar-like
sequential structure. If it is assumed that the event sequences carried out by users
of a software system are analogous to natural language, we would expect to find the
same predictive power in n-gram models of software event sequences as well.
There are several NLP models that could be used for this research. For ex-
ample, Hidden Markov Models (HMMs), are much more elaborate models with the
ability to track independent probability distributions, including those of hidden vari-
ables. We explore several NLP models and determine that n-gram language models
provide predictive power when modeling user behavior based on web logs. Under-
standing the behavior and utility of n-grams to build user profiles is a reasonable
prerequisite for using more advanced machine learning methods.
This work addresses the following challenges and makes the following corre-
sponding contributions to the realm of web-based user profile analysis:
Challenge 1: Several models exist for the analysis of user behavior.
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Contribution 1: In this work, we explore several statistical language models.
We successfully identify a suitable model for web-based usage behavior.
Challenge 2: There is no straightforward method to identify the behavior of
users that interact with web-based applications.
Contribution 2: We develop a novel keyword abstraction process to identify
user activity for each system user.
Challenge 3: It is complex to monitor user behavior without the use of
specialized hardware.
Contribution 3: We develop new techniques to monitor user behavior of web-
based applications using information that is already available to a system adminis-
trator.
Challenge 4: There is a trade off in performance when developing a CUA
system.
Contribution 4: We test the performance of our implementation using a large
set of evaluation metrics to access the feasibility of our approach.
Our final contribution is an empirical analysis of the CUA technique. This
method is applied to a government fielded training support website. Over a period




There are several types of web-based information systems. In this research, to
provide focus, we only consider web-based organizational information system ap-
plications described in Figure 1.12. These systems include executive, senior, mid-
dle, and worker-level access usage. To access these applications, employees must
use the organization’s network with an option to connect via virtual private net-
work (VPN). Modeling common websites without an organizational focus, such as
www.amazon.com, are beyond the focus of this research.




We believe the work presented in this research will provide an increased level of
security when combined with existing authentication techniques (e.g., passwords,
biometrics) to support many demands of today’s computing environment. While
conducting this research, we have witnessed how important it is to evaluate user be-
havior and provide a secure environment for our users to conduct their day-to-day
business. After reviewing the web logs for this study, we identified several IP ad-
dresses that were not indicative of the interaction of approved users. This prompted
the information assurance team to launch an investigation and put measures in place
to stop this activity. In this case, ID could have been utilized to identify and stop
interactions that do not closely resemble stored usage profiles.
Besides its importance to the realm of security, modeling user behavior, in
general, is an important process for the customization and adaptation of user-specific
needs3. Dynamic user modeling gives a current picture of how the user interacts with
the software. As a user’s interest and behavior changes over time, adaptive learning
can be applied to increase the predictive power of the models. This is needed
for CUA to be effective in this domain. We believe n-grams are highly effective
models that can be used to capture user interactions as sequences by aiding in the




The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we present
background and related work for statistical language models and continuous user
authentication. Chapter 3 highlights the contributions of our work. Specifically,
we show how Intruder Detector is used in typical settings and the valued-added for
this approach. In Chapter 4, we provide a detailed empirical evaluation and present
results for our CUA implementation. Finally, Chapter 5 contains an overview of our
work and areas for future research.
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Chapter 2: Background and Related Work
In this chapter, we present classical forms of authentication and describe the need
for non-intrusive, continuous authentication methods. We define and review existing
approaches in the CUA domain. We also focus on the use of Statistical Language
Models (SLM) to capture sequential behavior of users that interact with web-based
organizational information systems. A survey of these techniques is outlined in the
following sections to add context to this research.
2.1 Classical Authentication Methods
Various authentication methods exist. Passwords, smart cards, digital certificates,
kerberos, and biometrics are among the many authentication methods currently
employed. There are three classical forms of authentication: (1) something the user
knows; e.g. password, pin, (2) something the user has; e.g. smart card, Yubikey
[12], and (3) something the user is; e.g. iris scan, fingerprint.
These authentication mechanisms are useful but have well known limitations.
A single point-of-failure exists if a user’s password is compromised and later ac-
cessed by a malicious user. In addition, the patterns used when creating a password
warrants some concern because keystroke analysis indicates that users often resort
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to special patterns [13]. If a device is found unlocked or hijacked during a user
session, the system becomes compromised. Many biometric techniques also require
additional hardware to collect data. Biometrics are not secret [14]. Intruders can ob-
serve a user’s features and attempt to manipulate the system. Many companies and
organizations use Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to mitigate this risk. MFA
uses two or more classical forms of authentication to gain access to the system. If
one form of authentication is cracked, guessed, or otherwise stolen, an attacker’s
access is still prohibited.
The use of MFA has become more complex over time. Many banks offer special
apps and web logins but do not require the same MFA method when a customer
accesses their account from an ATM. User productivity can also decrease because
of the time it takes to use multiple authentication methods. For example, if a
company requires two-step authentication for 1000 employees using a password and
smart card; there will be 8000 login transactions if each user logs in 4 times per day
(8 entries). This also adds overhead to the system and multiple points-of-failure. It
is difficult to identify an intruder when using this form of authentication.
Various research studies have explored the use of authentication. Kaminsky
et al. address challenges for user authentication in a global file system [15]. This
approach uses an authentication server to identify users based on local information.
Researchers of cloud computing security methods have developed implicit authenti-
cation to identify a user’s past behavior to authenticate mobile devices [16]. These
two studies have one major limitation worth noting. They lack the ability to con-
tinuously monitor a user’s behavior as they interact with the system.
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2.2 Defining Continuous User Authentication
Cybersecurity has become a key concern for many organizations and companies. For
example, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) informed millions of govern-
ment and military employees that their personal information may be compromised
[17]. For many systems, the first line of defense is authentication. Google and
DARPA agree that elaborate password rules must be abandon and the use of strong
authentication should be used to avoid impersonations [18] [19].
Authentication techniques are usually performed at the beginning of a user
session. This form of one-time validation is ineffective in preventing malicious and
unintended use. For web applications, a password and username combination for
authentication has historically been used in the context of a person’s initial en-
counter with a computer system. Over twenty years ago, when e-commerce and
secure web was first introduced, passwords were mainly a stopgap measure. It was
expected that something better would replace it soon. As applications and devices
evolve, this means of authentication is becoming insufficient. CUA fills this gap
by transparently monitoring user activity in an effort to identify deviations from
normal workflow patterns. These patterns are stored usage profiles of each user of
the system. Figure 2.1 provides a simple description of how a system equipped with
CUA will work. The user is asked for traditional authentication credentials (i.e.,
username/password) to enter the application. After successful authentication, the
user begins interacting with the system. The user is asked to re-authenticated if cur-
rent interactions deviate from stored usage profiles. CUA adds an additional form
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of end-user authentication; something you do (e.g., typical patterns of behavior).
Figure 2.1: Flowchart for CUA
A robust CUA system has the following basic characteristics [20]:
• Continual: Re-authentication should be performed periodically to check if
the current user is the logged-in user.
• Non-intrusive: Intrusive authentication hinders usability and provides a neg-
ative experience for the user. Therefore, the system must provide a seamless,
non-intrusive user-friendly environment.
• Behavioral: The system must extract behavioral attributes from normal user
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operations. These attributes should be cost-effective and have unique usage
profiles for each user.
2.3 Existing Continuous User Authentication Techniques
The realm of CUA has been extensively evaluated with the use of biometrics. One
study uses cognitive fingerprints to measure computational behavior by means of
computational linguistics and structural semantic analysis [19]. This study uses a
combination of metrics that include eye scans and keystrokes to evaluate how the
user searches for and selects information. In addition, a number of CUA research
studies use one or more hard and soft biometric traits to continuously authenticate
a user. Niinuma et al. propose a CUA framework to automatically register the color
of a user’s clothing and their face as soft biometric traits [3][5]. Results from this
study show that the system is able to successfully authenticate the user with high
tolerance to the user’s posture. Limitations to these studies exist because of the
additional hardware that is needed to implement this technique which can become
costly if an entire organization uses this feature to authenticate users.
Monrose et al. propose an authentication method that uniquely identifies users
based on the analysis of keystrokes [8]. Keystroke dynamics focuses on how you type
versus what you type. The habitual typing rhythm of a user is a function of the user
and their environment. Therefore, limitations to this approach occur when the user
is faced with environmental factors that affect their typing pattern. Altinok et al.
propose a continuous biometric authentication system that provides an estimate of
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authentication certainty at any given time, even in the absence of any biometric data
[21]. In this case, the authentication uncertainty increases over time which leads to
a decrease in system usability. In a similar study, Kang et al. introduce temporal
integration of biometrics and behavioral features to continuously authenticate users
[22].
A face tracking system that uses color and edge information is used to compute
behavioral features. Shen et al. use mouse dynamics when implementing continu-
ous user authentication [7]. This technique is used to observe behavioral features
in mouse operations to detect malicious users. However, there are some existing
limitations with this emerging approach. Behavioral variability occurs because of
human or environmental factors. For example, if the user switches software envi-
ronments or experiences biological or emotional change, the user’s behavior will be
modified significantly. Such changes could possibly identify the user as an impostor.
Xie et al. use a notable approach to identify legitimate users early when using
online services by implementing a vouching process without the use of biometrics
[23]. They introduce a system, Souche, to monitor vouching via social communities
(i.e., Twitter, Email). Souche is effective in identifying 85% of legitimate users and
denying admission of malicious users. Our research seeks to solve similar issues
without the presence of social communities.
In recent years, mobile devices have been used to learn user behavior. Re-
searchers introduced SenSec as a mobile framework to collect sensory data to con-
struct a gesture model of how a user interacts with a mobile device [24]. Similar to
our work, n-grams are used to capture user patterns. The SenSec system achieves
16
over 70% accuracy in user classification and authentication tasks. In addition, Sae-
vanee et al. use multi-model biometric techniques with mobile devices using linguis-
tic profiling, keystroke dynamics and behavioral profiling for user authentication
[25]. Results from this study show a 91% reduction rate in the number of intrusive
authentication requests.
This body-of-work extends beyond the aforementioned research studies in the
following ways:
1. Instead of using traditional biometric traits, we explore the possibility of using
log information that is naturally generated by web applications to improve
usability through non-intrusive, transparent authentication.
2. This approach, integrated into a tool, uses a novel and simple n-gram language
model to capture user behavior.
3. Experiments are based on data from actual users of a fielded Department of
Defense (DOD) system who are completing day-to-day tasks.
2.4 Statistical Language Modeling (SLM)
In this research, we use SLM to classify users. This modeling technique has been
successfully implemented for a variety of language-based technologies. Document
classification [26], information retrieval [27], machine translation [28], and speech
recognition [29] all rely on this modeling technique. Many of these models decompose
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the probability of a sentence into a product of conditional probabilities [30].
P (wn1 ) = P (w1)P (w2|w1)P (w3|w21...P (wn|w1w2...wn−1)




P (wk|wk−11 ) (2.1)
where wk is the kth element in the sequence, and w
k−1
1 {w1, w2, w3, ..., wn, ...} is the
history, h. Table 2.1 summarizes the SLMs explored in this research. The following





Probabilistic Context-free Grammars 2.4.3
Decision Trees 2.4.4
n-grams 2.4.5
Hidden Markov Models 2.4.6
Table 2.1: Statistical Language Models.
2.4.1 Neural Networks
Neural networks, also referred to as artificial neural networks, for machine learning
and cognitive science, was inspired by biological neural networks. Neural network
models have demonstrated success in pattern recognition [31], financial modeling
[32], biomedicine [33], etc. This model uses interconnected neurons for communica-
tion. Each connection has adaptive weights that are tuned by a learning algorithm
(supervised and unsupervised). Continuous-valued features are used to automati-
cally learn as a function of the history [34]. Artificial neurons perform the following
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task:
1. Receive signals from other neurons in the network.
2. Multiply each signal by the corresponding connection strength (e.g., adaptive
weight).
3. Take the sum of the weighted signals and send them to an activation function.
4. Send output to other neurons in the network.
Topology and operational mode of neural networks vary in literature. However, the
most common configuration is to employ the use of an input layer, hidden layer
and output layer as shown in Figure 2.2. The number of input nodes at the input
layer is determined by feature values or independent variables. The output nodes
are dependent on the number of classes or values to predict. To date, there is no
optimal method to determine hidden nodes. If a network does not have enough
hidden nodes, the input and output mappings will not be learned well. On the
other hand, if there are too may hidden nodes, the network will generalize poorly on
unseen elements. When neural networks operate using probability, true incremental
learning is achieved. New training data can be added without retraining the entire
network model [35]. A novel neural network language model is described using the
following equation [36]:








Figure 2.2: Artificial Neural Network
where e is the entropy value, f is a set of features, λ is a set of weights, h is the
history and s represents the state of the hidden layer. n-grams, N , are used as the
learning algorithm for equation 2.2.
Jagadeesan et al. use a feed forward neural network with a backward prop-
agation method to continuously authenticate users. This implementation is based
on keyboard and mouse attributes. They use the k-nearest neighbor algorithm
for classification. Experiments with application-based user re-authentication per-
formed at 96.4% accuracy and 3.6% false alarms. For application-independent user
re-authentication, the system performed at 82%. All experiments were conducted
for relatively small data sets (i.e., 5 users).
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2.4.2 Maximum Entropy
Entropy represents the lack-of-order or predictability. The Principle of Maximum
Entropy is the correct distribution of P (a, b) which maximizes uncertainty, (i.e.,
entropy), based on constraints. By taking this approach, bias and assumptions are
eliminated. For example, if we examine the conditional probability distribution for
P (y|x), then the conditional entropy is as follows:







H(Y |X) is the entropy of random variable Y , given the value of another random
variable, X, is known [37]. When using the Principle of Maximum Entropy, infor-
mation from many sources can be combined into one language model. Such sources
can originate from n-grams with history information or local information. Rosen-
feld et al. use maximum entropy to create a single, combined model which captures
information from various knowledge sources [38]. Each knowledge source represents
a particular constraint. After constraints have been identified, a set of functions are
created and the function with the highest entropy (i.e., uncertainty) is chosen. This
adaptive approach to maximum entropy language modeling shows approximately
39% perplexity1, when trained on the Wall Street Journal corpus.
1Perplexity measures how well a statistical language model predicts a sample set of data.
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2.4.3 Probabilistic Context-free Grammars
Context-free grammars consists of terminals (w1, w2, ..., wV ), non-terminals (N1, N2,
..., Nn), a start symbol (N1), and rules. Terminal symbols represent context that
appear in the strings generated by the grammar. Non-terminal symbols are place-
holders for patterns of terminal symbols that can be generated by non-terminals.
A start symbol must be used as a special non-terminal to appear during the initial
string generation. Rules are used to replace non-terminals in a string with other
terminals/non-terminals.
〈Start〉 =⇒ X = 〈expression〉
〈expression〉 =⇒ number
〈expression〉 =⇒ (〈expression〉)
〈expression〉 =⇒ 〈expression〉+ 〈expression〉
〈expression〉 =⇒ 〈expression〉 − 〈expression〉
〈expression〉 =⇒ 〈expression〉 ∗ 〈expression〉
〈expression〉 =⇒ 〈expression〉/〈expression〉
(2.4)
Expressions in 2.4 is an example of a context-free grammar. This grammar is used
to form a mathematical expression with five terminals as operators (+, -, *, /)
and numbers. 〈expression〉 is the start symbol and the only non-terminal for this
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grammar. Suppose we want to find the correct grammar to generate X = 45+98∗4
as a mathematical expression. The context-free string generation in Figure 2.3 can
be used.
Figure 2.3: Context-free String Generation
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Grammar Probability
〈Start〉 =⇒ X = 〈expression〉 1.0
〈expression〉 =⇒ number .2
〈expression〉 =⇒ (〈expression〉) .11
〈expression〉 =⇒ 〈expression〉+ 〈expression〉 .30
〈expression〉 =⇒ 〈expression〉 − 〈expression〉 .15
〈expression〉 =⇒ 〈expression〉 ∗ 〈expression〉 .18
〈expression〉 =⇒ 〈expression〉/〈expression〉 .06
(2.5)
Probabilistic Context-free Grammars (PCFG) assign probability estimates to
each rule such that the sum of the probabilities for all rules expanding the same non-
terminal is equal to one. For example, the grammar in 2.5 includes probabilities that
should be used to generate an equation. If more than one trace through the grammar
exists, the grammar with the highest probability is chosen. PCFGs can be learned
from positive data examples alone but grammar induction is very difficult. This
form of language modeling is robust and in some cases provides better predictive
power than Hidden Markov Models. PCFGs are biased toward smaller trees by
making them more probable than trees with many traces.
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2.4.4 Decision Trees
Decision trees were first applied to language modeling by Bahl et al. to estimate
the probability of spoken words [39]. A single node is the starting point followed
by binary questions that are asked as a method to arbitrarily partition the space
of histories. As the space is partitioned, “leaves” are formed and training data
is used to calculate the conditional probability of P (w|h) for the next element.
As the traversal continues, the questioning becomes more informative by the use
of information theoretic metrics. Such metrics include Kolomogorov Complexity,
entropy, relative entropy, etc [40]. For example, if a person wants to assess how
much it would cost to live in certain neighborhoods, the simplified decision tree
in Figure 2.4 could be used. The root node, Location, is evaluated with children
nodes (Neighborhood, price.isMod) representing values for locations. The output for
these logical test are usually boolean values [41]. From Figure 2.4, we derive: “If
location=city ∧ neighborhood=northside ∧ condition=excellent, then the price for
homes in this area are expensive.”
Decision tree algorithms are primarily composed of training data, test data,
a heuristic evaluation function, and a stopping criterion function. These models
use recursion from the divide and conquer data structure to induce data from the
root node downward. Ultimately, decision trees represent the “gold-standard” for
partition-based models. However, size, complexity and data sparseness lead to mis-
classification of elements when trees are large. To simplify the tree structure, Breslow
et al. provide five top-level categories for tree simplification as seen in Table 2.2 [41].
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Table 2.2: Decision Tree Techniques.
Petrovskiy uses a combination of decision tree classification and time-dependent
features to learn user behavior for next-action prediction and anomaly detection
from database logs generated by a banking Intranet application [42]. Results show
that decision trees have fair performance for next-action prediction and very little
accuracy for anomaly detection.
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2.4.5 n-grams
Markov models have been heavily used for their predictive power. Markov models
assume that the probability of an occurring event is dependent only on the current
state of a system. As a simple example, imagine that we would like to track the
probability of a Sunny (S) day or Rainy (R) day of weather. To learn the probability
of a Sunny day, we could observe days for some period of time (e.g., 10 days), and
count the number of Sunny days observed, nSunny. Then, we could assign the
likelihood of a Sunny day occurring to be nSunny
10
. When waking up each morning,
we assume that the probability of a Sunny day is given by this same fixed rate. Under
this interpretation, to find P (SSSSS) (i.e., five Sunny days in a row), we would
simply solve P (S)5. Probabilities are computed based on a set of observations. The
observations can be mapped to a sequence of class labels {w1, w2, w3, ..., wn, ...}. In
this sequence, w1 represents the first observation, w2 the second, and so on. The
chain rule of probability theory computes the probability of an observation according
to some prior context available at each data point. When using this method, the
number of parameters grow exponentially with the number of observations in prior
context. Therefore, it is not feasible to accurately estimate conditional probabilities.
Instead of computing this type of probability, n-grams are used to approximate prior
history by looking at the last few observations.
In most cases, it is reasonable to apply the Markov assumption, which assumes
that the probability of observing wi is only dependent on a very small set of preceding
observations. Markov models make predictions on future elements without looking
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too far in the past. Therefore, n-gram models are Markov models which use (N−1)
elements of context to define the current state of the model [43]. These stochastic
process models are mostly stationary since we are assuming past behavior is a good
prediction of what will happen in the future. However, natural language is not
stationary because the probability of upcoming words can be dependent on events
that are arbitrarily distant and time dependent. Therefore, the statistical models
of n-grams only give an approximation of the correct distributions and entropies of
natural language. Constructing or training an n-gram model requires the ability
to observe example sequences occurring in the domain to be modeled. To train a
model well, single events from sequences in all relevant contexts must be observed.
Studies reveal that low-order Markov models do not make accurate predic-
tions because it does not look back far enough to past observations. Contrarily,
many limitations exist for higher order models. Reduced coverage, high state-space
complexity, and overall prediction accuracy are a few of the short comings of this
approach. In response, Desphande et al. introduce a technique to combine different
order Markov models to lower the state-space complexity while increasing coverage
and accuracy for web pages [44]. Their selective Markov model uses frequency, con-
fidence, and error pruning to discard certain states across different order Markov
models. Manavolglu et al. use a combination of maximum entropy mixture models
and Markov models to model behavior of web users [45]. Both models have various
strengths and weaknesses but when combined they are able to accurately identify
and visualize specific user behavior patterns. In this work, we seek to understand
the limitations that exist for high-order and low-order Markov (i.e., n-gram) models
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for user identification and the detection of outliers.
2.4.6 Hidden Markov Models
Hidden Markov Models (HMM) are Markov models whose process transitions be-
tween states in an unobservable path. However, output that is dependent on these
states are visible. Basic theory behind HMM was published in a series of classical
research papers [46] [47] [48]. HMMs have been conventionally applied to problems
that require the recovery of data sequences that are not immediately observable.
These models have been used for speech recognition, gene prediction, part-of-speech
tagging, activity recognition, etc.
An HMM is characterized by the following [49]:
1. N , represents the number of states, S, in the model. Individual states are
denoted as S = {S1, S2, S3, ..., Sn} and the state at time, t, is qt.
2. M , represents the number of distinct observation symbols per state (e.g., dis-
crete alphabet size). These symbols are denoted as V = {V1, V2, V3, ..., VM}
and correspond to the physical output of the modeled system.
3. Transition probability distribution for each state is denoted as A = {aij}.
4. B, represents the observation symbol probability distribution in state j, B =
{bj(k)}, where bj(k) = P [Vk at t|qt = Sj].











Figure 2.5: HMM for Weather Prediction
To illustrate this model, we consider the weather as a concrete example. In
Figure 2.5, observable conditions are rainy, sunny, or cloudy conditions. Factors that
influence theses outcomes are hidden states (e.g., high and low pressure). The start
state illustrates the initial probability of the model. On average, the model starts
with high pressure at 70%. Transition probabilities are represented by the change
in pressure in the underlying Markov chain. In this example, there is only a 40%
chance that tomorrow has low pressure, if today’s pressure is high. Probabilities for
observable states represent the likelihood of a particular weather condition occurring.
If we observe high pressure, there is a 40% chance it is sunny. To learn tasks, HMMs




This chapter presented an overview of related work for existing continuous user
authentication implementations. We explored various statistical language modeling
techniques that can possibly be applied to CUA tasks. Table 2.3 presents a high-





Fast training process with inher-
ent parallel structure. Training
samples can be added or removed
without extensive retraining.
Requires a large amount of mem-





sources while avoiding data frag-
mentation.
Can be infeasible due to computa-
tional challenges. Needs explicit
normalization.
PCFG Good for grammar induction.
Can be learned from positive data
and deal with grammatical errors.
Worst at modeling language for
English than n-grams. Only ob-







cause the space of histories and
space of possible questions can
grow very large even with smaller
data sets.
n-grams Reduces the dimensionality of the
estimation problem. Trigrams
(n=3) are often used for very
large training corpora and bi-
grams (n=2) for smaller sets.
Various smoothing techniques
must be used to battle the sparse
estimation problem.
HMM Able to construct a model of the
structure or process with observa-
tions only.
Requires annotated data for
training sets.
Table 2.3: Comparison of Statistical Language Models
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Chapter 3: Intruder Detector: A Tool for CUA
This chapter characterizes the application under evaluation (AUE). Specifically, we
show the significance of modeling user behavior with n-grams. We also describe key
contributions of this research. Each contribution provides the building blocks for
the Intruder Detector tool.
3.1 Web-based User Behavior Analysis
Modeling the behavior of users is an ongoing challenge in various application do-
mains [50]. In web applications, obtaining a better knowledge of the user and
purpose for the application is essential to provide an increased level of security.
Applications in this study are based on organizational information systems. Such
systems can be used for decision support, knowledge management, and e-learning.
It is important to continuously monitor users as they interact with these systems.
Insider threat, especially for decision support systems, can harm an organization’s
security practice, data, and computer system.
The web AUE for this research is a fielded government training support web-
site, User Productivity Enhancement, Technology Transfer and Training (PETTT)
Online Knowledge Center (OKC), for the high performance computing (HPC) com-
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munity. The PETTT activity is responsible for gathering the best ideas, algorithms,
and software tools emerging from the national HPC infrastructure and making them
available to the DOD and academic user community. This website is a repository
of PETTT programmatic and technical information. It provides training course
registration, course evaluation, information on several domain specific areas, and is
a general source of information for its community of users. The system is a Java-
based web application. Most pages are JavaServer Pages (JSP), with some servlets
handling various tasks. The primary database utilizes Oracle 11g enterprise edition.
Xwiki Framework and Apache Struts are leveraged to give users with elevated priv-
ileges the ability to manage their own content. This portion of the system runs over
a MySQL version 5.6.11 database. The operating system environment is Microsoft
Server 2008 R2.
Users have the option to authenticate via two methods: Common Access Card
(CAC) and Yubikey. The CAC is used to identify DOD civilian employees, Selected
Reserve, active duty uniform service personnel and government contractor personnel
[51]. This card can also be used to gain physical access to buildings, controlled
spaces, computer networks and systems. The Yubikey is a key-sized device that
is inserted into a user’s computer system USB slot to provide an added layer of
authentication. If users choose to login via Yubikey, they must enter a username
and password. Finally, they are directed to touch the Yubikey to generate a random
passcode to enter the web application. Figure 3.1 presents a subset of pages that
can be viewed by users of the AUE.
Each user account has one of the following associated roles; User, Administra-
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Authentication Page View 
Figure 3.1: PETTT OKC Page View
tor (Admin), Management (Mgmt), Technologist (Tech). The User group has limited
read access as well as the ability to enroll, evaluate, and register for courses. There
are additional roles that provide access to areas of the system for administrative
purposes (Admin, Mgmt, Tech). The most prominent of these is the Technologist
role. These users interact with the system often as content administrators. Con-
tent administrators add updated data to the system, approve students for online
training, arrange content, etc. Therefore, while we have more individual sessions
available for the User role, the Tech role provides more keyword data. Users with
the Admin role focus on technology/information integration, and data management
as well as enhancements to the design and operation of PETTT OKC. The Mgmt
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role is reserved for those who provide oversight of the application. They are not
very active users of this web application. Tech and Admin roles pose the greatest
risk when access is unauthorized.
3.2 Feasibility Study
To provide an assessment of our approach, we analyze four preliminary models for
the classification of role-based user data by observing the accuracy of individual
actions (IA), frequency of individual actions (Freq-IA), pairs of actions (PA), and
frequency of pairs of actions (Freq-PA). This data is obtained from the OKC web
log files. It is our intuition that accuracy from these approaches will yield less than
optimal results and statistical language models, such as n-grams, must be used.
The data for each approach is partitioned into training and test set examples
using the 90/10, 80/20 and 70/30 data split technique (training/test) as shown
in Table 3.1. The data is sorted and placed into a training and test vector for
comparison and classification. We compare the four preliminary approaches to n-
gram models using the same partitioning. Section 4.1.1 provides more detail on the
n-gram implementation. We run each experiment 10 times. For the evaluation of IA,
we use binary numbers to identify matches in the vector. A “1” represents a keyword
match and a “0” represents a mismatch. The ones are added and normalized by the
size of the test set. Next, we evaluate PA. We would like to know if classification
accuracy increases when pairs of keywords are used. We group training and testing
sets as in the IA example using a Java HashMap data structure. If pairs are matched,
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the numerical key for the HashMap is increased until the entire set is evaluated.
Finally, we divide the total number of matched pairs by the total number of pairs
that exist in the test keyword dataset. Next, we observe classification accuracy for
Freq-IA and Freq-PA. For each individual or keyword pair, we use a HashMap to
count the number of times the keyword (or keyword pair) exist in the training and
test dataset. If the frequency counts of the training and testing keyword pairs are
within five, we classify the frequency as a match and add it to the classification
accuracy.




























Table 3.1: Number of Keywords and Sessions for Each Data Split
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Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 show role-based accuracy results for this feasibility
study. It was our intuition that the use of individual keywords would yield the
worst accuracy. In each data split this accuracy is less than 10%. Classification of
roles based on pairs of keywords produce the highest accuracy for each data split
with less than 50% accuracy for the 90/10 data split. The Technologist role has
a noticeable increase in accuracy when evaluating frequency of individual actions
based on the 70/30 data split. The 90/10 data split yields the least performance for
each preliminary classification technique.
Figure 3.2: Role Classification Based on 70/30 Data Split
From this study, we show the accuracy of classifying users of organizational
web-based systems based on four preliminary approaches and one SLM; individual
keywords, pairs of keywords, frequency of individual keywords, pairs of keywords, and
n-grams, using representative samples of data from pre-classified instances. Based
on each data split and model, n-grams significantly outperform preliminary models
with approximately 90% accuracy for many user roles. We hypothesize that the
use of statistical language models could offer more predictive power for sequences
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Figure 3.3: Role Classification Based on 80/20 Data Split
Figure 3.4: Role Classification Based on 90/10 Data Split
of web-based interactions. We address model-specific differences for n-grams in
Chapter 4.
3.3 CUA Paradigm for Web-based Applications
We now discuss key contributions of this work which serve as building blocks for the
Intruder Detector tool.
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3.3.1 Contribution 1: Model Selection
Natural Language Web Behavior Language Example
Word Link selection View profile
Phrase View Watch online training
video
Sentence Action Search for archived
files
Paragraph Activity Register for course
Document Event Prepare course
evaluation report
Table 3.2: Comparison of Natural Language and Web Behavior
It is important to understand individual and role-based behavior to detect
common patterns. Specifically, we would like to use web logs to build usage profiles
for each user. Grammars can be defined for human behavior and natural language
[52] [53]. Table 3.2 illustrates the commonalities between natural language and web-
based user behavior. Links or buttons in a web application represent a basic level
of vocabulary for web behavior. A series of link clicks give the user the ability to
view various portions of the website (e.g., course videos). Meaningful sequential
link selections may lead to various actions, activities, or events. Since web logs
represent sequential actions, they can be encoded as sequences of symbols and used
with a standard NLP technique to build computational usage models [54]. In this
research, we experiment with n-grams to model sequences of keywords, each of
which represent a user action. We use n-grams, derived from Markov models, to
understand similarity in user actions to classify the user’s identity. These generative
models can learn each category of users then classify the users based on the generated
knowledge. This method gives us the ability to perform user authentication task
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with only positive training samples.
Classification of data becomes more feasible after n-grams have been derived.
Let us illustrate how n-grams can be used for classification. Suppose a bi-gram
model, (i.e., N = 2), of user behavior that is captured after training is:
n = U1U2U1U3U1U4U1U5U2U3
where Ui is an observation from a user behavioral sequence. When a user’s test
sequence is read as {U1, U2, U3}, bi-grams are generated as {U1U2, U2U3}. The prob-
ability for this bi-gram to occur will be calculated using the following equation:
P =
# of valid observations
# of observations
(3.1)
The sequence is normal if P is greater than or equal to a preset threshold value, t.
After applying Equation 3.1, (i.e., P = 2
2
= 1), the observations will be identified as
normal if we select a threshold value of 0.6. We assume user activity is largely based
on role (i.e., access level). In our work, probabilities of n-grams are computed based
on a large web log dataset (see Table 3.1). We assume users with the same role are
likely to perform similar actions. System trust increases as the user interacts with
the system and no outliers are identified in the CUA user model.
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Field name Value Description
Remote host address 134.164.78.20 IP address of client
Remote log name - Name is unavailable
User name rleonard@HPCMP.HPC.MIL User account that is
accessing application




Log file entry was cre-
ated April 8, 2015
at 5:39 P.M. The dif-
ference between the







used for the admin reg
file using HTTP ver-
sion 1.0
Service status code 200 Request fulfilled suc-
cessfully
Bytes sent 3401 Number of bytes sent
Table 3.3: NCSA Common Log File Entry
3.3.2 Contribution 2: Keyword Abstraction
Web server logs are obtained for system users and are grouped into sessions of ac-
tivity by role. Access-level web-based systems have user roles already identified.
An entry from the web server log is shown in Figure 3.5. The format for web logs
was standardized by the National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA),
founder of Mosaic browser, Apache HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP), and Com-
mon Gateway Interface (CGI). Table 3.3 describes the NCSA web log entry format.
Figure 3.5: NCSA Common Log File Format
We must pre-process the logs to remove unwanted entries. This helps validate
the data captured in a user’s session [55]. Pre-processing web log data can be difficult
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due to local caching and proxy servers. Web servers will not register repeated access
to pages that are locally cached. If a proxy server is used, all web access entries
will have the same identifier even though different users are accessing the website.
Therefore, pre-processing is a critical component of the usage behavioral process.
The following steps are used for this process:
1. Data Cleaning : The process of data cleaning is very important to generate
an accurate picture of user activity when navigating a web application. Re-
moving irrelevant request, data fields/columns, and system generated text are
essential. For web logs, various graphics and scripts are generated which add
several entries to the log file. However, in the web AUE, only JavaServer
Page (.jsp) entries show user behavior and are important for logging purposes.
Therefore, all entries are removed that are not related to user activity.
2. User Identification: We use heuristics to determine users. A user is a person
that interacts with the AUE. Once the data is clean, the remaining file entries
are grouped by individual user. Each interaction in the web log file has a
user-id association. Once the user-ids are captured, they are classified within
ID based on their pre-defined role in the system. We avoid identifying users
by IP address because the same IP address may be used by a group of users.
3. Session Identification: Session identification is used to divide user accesses
into individual sessions [55]. User sessions are pre-defined in the AUE web
log. After checking the database for the role of each user, sessions are then
grouped by role.
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4. Keyword Generation: For each relevant web log entry, a portion of the string
is captured as a keyword. We load keywords for all users/roles into a database
to build usage profiles. Figure 3.6 shows an example of keywords extracted
from a web log file. We do not consider parameters in this process because
user entries would be too unique to categorize in a model.
Figure 3.6: Keyword Generation.
3.3.3 Contribution 3: Tool Support
ID is a tool, created during this study, to abstract keywords from log files, build
n-grams, and categorize users based on observed behavior. We use customized ap-
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plication programming interfaces (API), described in Section 3.4, to load input data
and split the data based on pre-defined user roles or individual users. During the
test phase of the experiments, a probability is assigned to a sequence of events.
A probability alone does not provide continuous authentication. We use two ap-
proaches; binary and multi-class classification. Multi-class classification scores an
input sequence according to one of many user models. For the mth classifier, the
positive examples are all data points in class m and negative examples are all data
points not in class m. Sequences of activity are categorized as belonging to the
model which estimates the highest probability using the following equation:
u = arg max
m
P (K,m) (3.2)
A more complex scheme which can also be useful for continuous authentication is
binary classification [56] [57]. For effective evaluation, this classification method
requires more training and test data. This classification technique is used to judge a
sequence as having likely been generated by a specific model (PASS) or not (FAIL).
A probability threshold, t, is then used for this pass/fail type of judgment for a se-
quence. Any sequence whose probability exceeds this threshold should be considered
as a PASS, +1, and otherwise considered FAIL, −1.
A decision rule is used to predict the class membership of a given sequence of
behavioral keywords, K. When new samples are encountered, the following decision
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rule is used: 
P (K,m) > t, then y = +1
P (K,m) < t, then y = −1
(3.3)
where P (K,m) is the probability the behavioral keyword sequence is generated by
the mth user’s n-gram model. The probabilities are estimated using a training set
of labeled data,
(m0, y0), (m1, y1), (m2, y2), ..., (mn, yn)
where label yi = ±1 and depends on the class of mi. Binary classification is used by
a simple threshold and multi-class classification by comparing probabilities to trans-
late n-gram models’ estimations of sequence probability into decisions. The ability
to make accurate classifications is investigated as supported by these algorithms.
3.3.4 Contribution 4: Evaluation Criteria
There is a large variation in the evaluation metrics used for classification systems.
Metrics used for a research study must be appropriate for the problem domain. A
confusion matrix, also known as contingency matrix, can be used to describe the
performance of a classification system based on test data for which the positive (i.e.,
true) values are known. In Figure 3.7, a confusion matrix is used for the classification
of positive and negative examples. True positives, TP, represent cases in which the
prediction and actual value are correct (i.e., positive). True negatives, TN, are
captured when the actual and predicted value is negative. False negatives, FN,
represent cases where the prediction is negative and the actual category is positive.
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Finally, false positives, FP, capture cases where the prediction is positive and the
actual category is negative. False positives and false negatives are also known as
Type 1 errors and Type II errors, respectively.
Optimal performance of any classification system is to reduce false positives
and false negatives. Evaluation criteria, shown in Table 3.3.4, for a classifier can be
Figure 3.7: Confusion Matrix
Metric Formula
Accuracy (TP + TN)/(TN + TP +
FN + FP )
Recall (True Positive Rate) (TP )/(FN + TP )
False Positive Rate (FP )/(TN + FP )
Specificity (TN)/(TN + FP ) or 1 mi-
nus False Positive Rate
Precision (TP )/(FP + TP )
Prevalence (FN + TP )/(TN + TP +
FN + FP )
F-measure (2 xPrecision xRecall)/(Precision
+Recall)
Table 3.4: Metrics Computed from Confusion Matrix
obtained from statistical measures in Figure 3.7. To efficiently evaluate these metrics
the dataset must be partitioned. We take a dataset whose class label we already
know (i.e., actual data) and place them in a training set. To identify how well the
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classifier performs with unseen data, a testing set is used. This will indicate how well
the classifier generalizes. In this case, both sets contain previously classified data.
We would also like these datasets to be large. Larger training sets provide better
classifiers and larger test sets help build confidence in the evaluated metrics. We
perform a repeated holdout method for the partition by randomly selecting instances
for training and test sets. We use the 90/10, 80/20, and 70/30 training/test splits
in this research. We repeat the hold out method 10 times and average the results
to get an overall value for the metric being observed.
Accuracy is the simplest form of evaluation and is used to determine how
often the classifier is correct. If the classifier correctly labels half of the dataset,
then we say its accuracy is 50%. In many cases, it seems obvious that we have
better predictive power as the accuracy of a model increases. Suppose we have a
binary classifier to detect the presence of breast cancer in patients. From Figure 3.8,
Figure 3.8: Confusion Matrix Example
accuracy = (0 + 100)/(10 + 0 + 100 + 0) = 90.9%. This model is completely useless
with zero predictive power because the classifier is predicting only negative exam-
ples. However, the accuracy for this classifier is very high. This scenario represents
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an Accuracy Paradox which states that models with a given level of accuracy may
have greater predictive power than models with very high accuracy. In some cases,
accuracy alone can be misleading. This metric is better used together with other
measures. Precision and recall address the imbalance that can occur in a dataset.
Precision answers the following question: When the classifier predicts a positive ex-
ample, how often is it correct? On the other hand, recall answers: When evaluating
all the positive examples in a dataset, what fraction of the dataset did the classifier
identify? A perfect classifier will have 100% precision and recall. However, in real
world classification tasks, reaching this optimal performance is difficult to achieve.
If the classifier is tweaked to offer very high recall, then precision rates suffer. Alter-
natively, classifiers that are tweaked for high precision rates, suffer from poor recall
rates. To provide balance, the f-measure is used as the weighted harmonic mean of
precision and recall. There are many metrics for evaluating classification systems.
In this research, we consider a specific set of metrics for evaluation since various
metrics provide different and valuable insight into how each model performs. False
positive rates and prevalence are measured, in addition to, accuracy, recall, precision
and f-measure to provide additional analysis for each model.
3.4 Continuous User Authentication Infrastructure
We use several custom APIs for the continuous user authentication infrastructure.
The WeblogDataHandler is a front-end API that is used to load keyword data and
split it into training and test sets. Table 3.5 provides details for each method call.
48
TestDataManager is a Java tool used for storing and retrieving keyword data (see
Table 3.6). We use a non-relational document database, MongoDB1, as a back-
end data store. MongoDB is a NoSql (i.e., non-relational) database structured in
favor of JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) documents. We serialize each keyword
document into JSON before adding them to the MongoDB for storage.
We use the BerkeleyLM N-gram Language Model Library to construct n-gram
models from keyword data. BerkeleyLM is a library for estimating and storing large
n-gram language models in memory [58]. This library also provides efficient access
to data. We extend this open source Java library with the TestDataManager and
Analyzer APIs. Tables 3.7 and 3.8 show all methods used for these extensions.
Specifically, we use the categorizeStoredSequence method for multi-class classi-
fication and the acceptRawSequenceGivenModel method for binary classification.
Each API is designed to handle large-scale experiments with keyword data. Figure
3.9 provides a detailed high-level view of the CUA framework. This figure outlines
the steps we follow to complete this task.
3.5 Intruder Detector in Action
We will now show, via an example, how ID works when web log data is present.
Assume that, over time, web logs have been collected for users of a web-based
system. ID has developed, for each user, an n-gram model, essentially representing
the user’s typical behavior. Alice, an administrator, typically starts from her user
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Figure 3.9: CUA Framework Description
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set of tasks associated with this role, namely submit new bugs, view existing bugs,
submit new change requests, view current change requests, etc.
Figure 3.10: n-gram Model of Alice.
Figure 3.10 represents an n-gram behavioral user-model for Alice. The nodes in
the model represent actions that Alice performs on the web pages. Edges represent
a workflow relationship between these actions; the numeric values represent the
probability that these actions will occur. For example, a probability of 1.0 from
“start” to “profile” implies that Alice always starts at the “profile” page; once in
the “admin” page, the user is likely to start a “new bug form” with the probability
of 0.2. Once in the “new bug form,” Alice has the option to go back to the “profile
page” or “admin page” (with equal probability); the user may then return to the
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“new bug form.” However, there is no option to go directly to the “show bugs filter”
page from a “new bug form.”
ID has a stored model for Alice since she has used the web application in
the past. However, ID is continuously monitoring her. As she interacts with the
software, a series of web requests, in the form of web log entries, are recognized by
the tool. These web log entries are translated into a sequence of keywords: 〈start,
profile, admin page, show bugs filter, show bugs, show bugs filter, admin page, end〉.
ID continuously checks all the stored models and matches the sequence to Alice’s
model. Alice is authenticated and allowed to continue using the application.
After some time, Alice decides to take a break and walks away from her com-
puter before logging out of the system. Bob, without authorization, takes control
of her session. Bob is a user with lower system privileges and has no idea how to
work the system as an Admin. The keywords generated from Bob’s interactions
are 〈admin page, show request filter, admin page, new bug form, admin page, end〉.
When comparing this sequence to the usage profile for Alice, ID identifies Bob as
a potential intruder and the session is ended (or Bob is asked to re-authenticate,
depending on how ID is configured).
There are several points to note regarding this overview scenario. First, we
deliberately keep the n-gram model very simple so as to be easily understandable.
This simple model represents N=2 with a history of zero. At this step, it is impor-
tant to understand that the n-gram model captures much more information than is
apparent with this simple example. Second, we show only one model (e.g., Alice’s
model). In general, ID will maintain multiple models, one for each user. Having a
54
model for Bob may give ID the ability to capture his identity. However there are
some limitations to pinpointing Bob’s identity which will be discussed in this work.
Third, such models may be maintained for classes of users, not just individual users.
It is important to distinguish between multiple user types and their different behav-
iors (e.g., admin users typically access the “take tape backups” page; conventional
users do not).
Finally, ID can be configured to incrementally improve its models during exe-
cution. Consider that Alice executes a new sequence of actions not contained in her
n-gram model. ID will recognize the mismatch and ask for re-authentication (e.g.,
via a password or supervisor approval). If this transaction is successful, then the
sequence of actions that was not recognized is added to the n-gram model, thereby
improving its accuracy. This will also be the case if the user interface is updated.
Subsequently, if Alice performs the same sequence of actions, ID will recognize it
as legitimately belonging to Alice. When fielded, we envision ID to be used in a
training mode to build baseline models of all users; and then used in a deployment
mode.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we described the main contributions of this work. We used a prac-
tical implementation of the n-gram model to estimate the relative likelihood of a
sequence of web log keywords. We provided a typical use-case for the Intruder De-
tector tool. Novel techniques for keyword abstraction, statistical language modeling,
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and optimal classifier evaluation are the key building blocks of this web-based CUA
approach. In the next chapter, we provide details of an empirical evaluation of our
implementation.
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Chapter 4: Empirical Evaluation of Continuous User Authentication
This chapter provides a detailed description of a set of experiments using real-
world user data designed to investigate the utility of n-gram models for continuous
user authentication. Specifically, we answer three research questions using a set of
classification-based performance metrics.
4.1 Performance Assessment
We conduct performance assessments to evaluate the feasibility of our approach. A
variety of performance metrics are available for classification systems. We start our
analysis with the following metrics:
• Accuracy: How often is the classifier correct?
• Recall (i.e., True Positive Rate or Sensitivity): When it’s actually X,
how often does the classifier predict X?
• Precision:When the classifier predicts X, how often is the classifier correct?
• F-measure Harmonic mean of precision and recall.
• False Positive Rate: When its actually not X, how often does classifier
predict X?
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• Specificity: When it’s actually not X, how often does the classifier not predict
X?
• Prevalence: How often does each role/user occur in the data set?
Based on these metrics, we will answer the following research questions:
• RQ1: Can discriminating user models be constructed to determine user types?
• RQ2: Can the model recognize various legitimate users who are operating in
the same user session?
• RQ3: Can usage profiles be used to identify outliers in the user’s behavior?
4.1.1 Experimental Setup
Once the keyword abstraction technique outlined in Section 3.3.1 is complete, we
begin predicting user behavior. When predicting individual and role-based user
behavior, web logs are filtered to abstract only those users who have at least two
sessions of activity. To ensure we have enough keyword data for individual user
behavior, we abstract only those users who have at least 800 keywords. Tables
4.1 and 4.2 provide the number of users and roles that were captured after the
keyword abstraction process. We also identify how often labeled data occurs in
our dataset using the prevalence metric. Experiments were conducted using various
configurations to better understand the strengths and weaknesses of our approach.
We split the data, based on sessions of activity, using the 90/10, 80/20, and 70/30
training/test data split for individual users and roles using the same number of
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keywords and sessions described in Section 3.2, Table 3.1. Data splits help maintain
purity of the evaluation. Therefore, no model should be evaluated on its ability to
classify data which was used during its own training phase. The models for each data
split are based on N = 2 (bi-grams), N = 3 (tri-grams), N = 4 and N = 5. The use
of data splits with various n-gram models will identify which model performs better
for the continuous user authentication task. We use the repeated holdout method
to randomly select training and test sets. We run 10 iterations for each model and
provide an average value for each metric.





Table 4.1: Role-based Dataset














Table 4.2: User-based Dataset
Constructing, or training, an n-gram model requires the ability to observe
example sequences occurring in the domain to be modeled. To train a model well,
single events must be observed from sequences in all relevant contexts. This is the
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challenge that occurs when evaluating classifiers in the NLP domain. Conditional
probabilities are captured when evaluating n-gram models. The number of possible
parameters needed by the model grows not only according to events observed, but
also exponentially by the history being considered. For the best possible model,
our training phase requires observations of every possible event in every possible
context. Additionally, there is a need to observe each context multiple times to
have confidence that parameters are accurate. Without sufficient training, event
sequences may be encountered during the test phase for which there is no knowledge
to provide a probability estimate.
Researchers from the NLP domain have addressed this challenge of insufficient
or sparse data for n-gram models. A concept known as smoothing involves saving
some probability mass in an n-gram model’s probability distribution for unseen
events [59]. Several smoothing techniques exist for language models such as Addi-
tive, Good-Turing Estimate, Katz, Witten-Bell, and Kneser-Ney [59]. The models
in this experiment use the Kneser-Ney smoothing technique [60]. Smoothing has
significant effects on the probability of n-gram models. At a high level, Kneser-Ney
smoothing involves:
• Reserving probability mass for unseen events by reducing all probabilities by
a constant discounting percentage.
• Estimate missing higher-order conditional probabilities by incorporating the
observed frequencies of lower-order prefixes (a concept known as backoff).
• More precisely, combining the frequency of lower-order n-grams with a concept
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called continuation probability, which estimates the probability that an event
completes an n-gram, to estimate the probability of event sequences.
The original reference should be reviewed for a complete explanation of Kneser-
Ney smoothing [60]. Potential risks of applying Kneser-Ney to the domain of events
carried out on software are violations of key features above. For example, if very
few events are being performed by users, applying a constant discounting to every
probability may save too much probability mass for unseen events.
4.1.2 Experimental Results and Analysis
4.1.2.1 Multi-class Classification
For each metric, we compare ID’s recommended category to the actual category
of each test session. A percentage of keywords are reserved based on a data split
to represent the testing set, E, and use the remaining data as the training set, R,
to train an N order n-gram model for the specified class. P (K,m) is calculated
for each sample of keywords, K, from E. This represents the probability that the
keywords are generated by the mth users n-gram model. Finally, m is selected with
the highest probability for the behavioral keyword sequence, P (K,m), and used as
the prediction value.
We compute each metric for each class label and analyze the performance. We
also average these values to get an overall metric value. We first consider whether
unique profiles can indeed be constructed. Models are developed for each user and
role as described in Section 3.3.3. To evaluate role-based behavior for RQ1, we
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observe that a random model with no observations would achieve 25% accuracy
when categorizing users. If the models generated are effectively capturing unique
details about the behavior of users within roles, we would expect to see much greater
overall accuracy in multi-class classification.
(a) N=2 (b) N=3
(c) N=4 (d) N=5
Figure 4.1: Role-based Accuracy
Instead of focusing on the four pre-defined user roles, RQ2 focuses on the
ability of n-gram models to capture the behavior of specific users regardless of role.
To evaluate this research question, the data is filtered to include only those users
which have at least two sessions of activity and at least 800 total keywords. For the
users meeting this criteria, we train models according to the n-gram approach. After
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(a) N=2 (b) N=3
(c) N=4 (d) N=5
Figure 4.2: User-based Accuracy
(a) Overall Role-based Accuracy (b) Overall User-based Accuracy
Figure 4.3: Overall Accuracy
filtering the data, 3945 users are captured for role-based classification and ten users
are captured for user-based classification. Accuracy shows how often the classifier
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where total is the total number of predictions made for a particular user/role. Accu-
racy results are shown for roles and users in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2. We average
the role and user based accuracies and present them in Figure 4.3.
(a) N=2 (b) N=3
(c) N=4 (d) N=5
Figure 4.4: Role-based Recall Rate
There are 63,467 user-based and 95,223 role-based keywords generated for this
study. Based on our results, the 90/10 data split shows linear increase of accuracy for
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(a) N=2 (b) N=3
(c) N=4 (d) N=5
Figure 4.5: User-based Recall Rate
(a) Overall Role-based Recall (b) Overall User-based Recall
Figure 4.6: Overall Recall
smaller training sets (individual users) with approximately 93-94% accuracy (Figure
4.3b). For larger datasets (i.e., role-based), accuracy is less than 90%. On average,
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the best role-based model of accuracy is N=2 at approximately 86% (Figure 4.3a).
Accuracy of the system generally decreases when classifying a large number of users
in the role-based experiment. Overall, each role-based model achieved above 78%
accuracy. The Tech role has the largest number of keywords used for training each
data split. Initially, we expected this role to have the highest accuracy for each
model and data split. However, the Tech role performed best (i.e., 90%) for bi-
grams with the 90/10 data split. Conversely, the User role has the largest number
of training sessions and lowest accuracy (less than 80%) for each model. The User
role has 3,893 users in the dataset with short sequences of interaction. Because these
sequences exist, the n-gram model may have difficulty learning behavior from this
category of users. From equation 4.1, we see that accuracy focuses more on the total
number of True Positives and True Negatives. From this metric, we are unable to
evaluate false classifications. We also observe a large class imbalance based on the
labeled dataset that can possibly lead to an Accuracy Paradox, described in Section
3.3.4. Therefore, we have minimum confidence in the accuracy metrics presented.
This leads to the evaluation of recall, precision, f-measure, and false positive rate.
Next, we evaluate each model’s recall. Recall measures the proportion of
positive examples that are correctly identified as positive. This measure of relevance





Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show recall rates for roles and individual users, respectively. The
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(a) N=2 (b) N=3
(c) N=4 (d) N=5
Figure 4.7: Role-based Precision Rate
Tech role’s recall increases approximately 10% as N increase from 2 to 3 through
5. The User model, with more users and less keywords, performs best for bi-grams
at approximately 75% (Figure 4.4). The Mgmt role has the least recall due to the
small number of sessions and keywords used for training and testing. However, we
observe higher recall for individual users within the Mgmt role (e.g., User1, User7)
using the bi-gram 90/10 data split (Figure 4.5-a). We assumed User5, from the Tech
role, would have the highest recall since this user has the largest number of training
keywords for each data split. Yet, we observed approximately 60% recall for 90/10
bi-grams and an increase to 80% recall as N increased to 5. This user is one of the
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(a) N=2 (b) N=3
(c) N=4 (d) N=5
Figure 4.8: User-based Precision Rate
(a) Overall Role-based Precision (b) Overall User-based Precision
Figure 4.9: Overall Precision
most active web users. We consider the classification task performance struggles
due to a high variability in the daily task of this particular user. User-based models
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show a steady overall recall rate for each data split and model at approximately 60%
(Figure 4.6-b). However, this steady rate is not observed for larger session/keyword
data sets (i.e., role-based). In this case, the bi-gram 90/10 model has the highest
overall recall rate at approximately 65% (Figure 4.6-a).
Precision measures the fraction of predicted examples that are relevant. This





We notice a shift in performance when evaluating precision. The User role consis-
tently has the highest precision rate for each model at approximately 90% with less
than 60% precision for the Tech role. This observation holds for individual users
within this role (e.g., User3) with approximately 90% precision for the 70/30 bi-gram
model. Therefore, the classifier is more precise when predicting roles that have more
per-session data available. The lack of precision for User7, from the Mgmt role, is
due to the small number of sessions and keywords captured for this user. Figures
4.7 and 4.8 show precision rates for roles and individual users, respectively.
Historically, precision and recall have been used as classification performance
metrics. In many machine learning research papers, precision is more informative
for non-binary classifiers. During our analysis, we determined which metric or com-
bination of metrics is most informative for the task of identifying users and roles.
In some cases, it is very difficult to assess the performance of precision and recall
separately. The f-measure, as described in Section 3.3.4, combine these into a single
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measure of classification effectiveness. Figures 4.10 and 4.11 show f-measure results
for roles and individual users, respectively.
f -measure = 2× precision× recall
precision+ recall
(4.4)
Next, we measure the false positive rate (FPR). This metric is used to deter-
mine the rate at which false alarms are generated. Optimally, we would like this
ratio to be very low. FPR becomes critical when users with lower privileges are
predicted to be users with higher privileges. This action can cause severe risk to a






The f-measure for the User role is 81% with 14% false positive rate (90/10 data
split only) for bi-grams and decreases to 60% for the rest of the models (N=3 through
N=5). Since this category of users has the largest number of training sessions, bi-
grams may have better performance when more per-session behavior from each user
is present in the dataset. Individual users with the User role have a high f-measure
(87%) with the same model (bi-gram 90/10 data split). In this case, recall and
precision are above 70% (precision=88%, recall=75%). User3, from the User role
category, has the highest f-measure among all users individually evaluated. If we
only rely on accuracy, our results would tell a different story. From the accuracy
perspective, the User role has the lowest accuracy for each model.
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(a) N=2 (b) N=3
(c) N=4 (d) N=5
Figure 4.10: Role-based F-measure
The f-measure for the Tech role is approximately 83% for bi-grams with the
80/20 and 70/30 data splits (with 10% FPR) and holds at a steady rate of approxi-
mately 80% for other models and data splits. The Tech role has the largest number
of keywords used for training with 59% prevalence. Generally, the larger the train-
ing set, the better the classifier for this category of users. The Mgmt role has the
lowest f-measure for each model. All data splits for this category perform below
40%. This role has the smallest number of training sessions and keywords in our
dataset. The Mgmt user, User1, has a bi-gram, 90/10 data split, f-measure of 67%
and Mgmt user, User7, has a bi-gram, 90/10 data split, f-measure of 30%. After
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(a) N=2 (b) N=3
(c) N=4 (d) N=5
Figure 4.11: User-based F-measure
(a) Overall Role-based F-measure (b) Overall User-based F-measure
Figure 4.12: Overall F-measure
carefully analyzing the data set, we find that User1 has more sessions of activity (6
sessions) than User7 (2 sessions). Even though, User7 passed the initial criteria of
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(a) N=2 (b) N=3
(c) N=4 (d) N=5
Figure 4.13: Role-based False Positive Rate
having at least 2 sessions of activity and 800 keywords, this user’s f-measure is low.
In this case, it is necessary to capture more session data per user.
The Admin and User roles have approximately the same number of keywords
for training and their f-measure performance is approximately the same for data
models N=3 through N=5 (see Figure 4.10)1. This shows that there could be some
correlation in performance when classifying such models with the same range of
keywords. To train individual users and category of users well, there is a noticeable
difference in the number of keywords needed. For example, higher f-measure rates
1The difference in the number of keywords for Admin and User is approximately 2000. This is
the closest range for all categories observed in the dataset.
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(a) N=2 (b) N=3
(c) N=4 (d) N=5
Figure 4.14: User-based False Positive Rate
(a) Overall Role-based FPR (b) Overall User-based FPR
Figure 4.15: Overall FPR
were received for users with approximately 850 keywords and 120 sessions (90/10
data split) and roles with approximately 30,000 keywords and 400 sessions (80/20
74
and 70/30 data split). The f-measure, on average, for role-based bi-grams perform at
the highest and approximately the same rate (62%) for each data split (Figure 4.12-
a). However, only the bi-gram 90/10 data split for user-based f-measure performs
the highest at 60% (Figure 4.12-b).
The User role has the highest FPR for bi-grams using each data split with
70/30 data split having a slightly higher FPR (approximately 16%). However, when
observing the classification of users with this role (i.e., User3), the 70/30 data split
performs best at approximately 1% FPR. As N increases to three, four, and five, the
Tech role has the highest FPR for each data split with the 90/10 data split having
the highest/worst FPR for each model. It is important to emphasize that this data
set has only 14% of keyword data labeled as User and 59% labeled as Tech. Since
the Tech role is more prevalent than all roles combined, we observed an increased
FPR for this role. Overall, we obtain less than 5% FPR for User-based models with
N = 5, 90/10 data split models having the least FPR (Figure 4.15-b).
4.1.2.2 Binary Classification
When addressing RQ3, we want to consider whether the role-specific profiles con-
structed as part of RQ1 are capable of detecting outliers in user behavior. To
evaluate this research question, we use the models generated from RQ1 indepen-
dently in a binary classification approach, as described in Section 3.3.3. Because
this task offers only two possible classes, a random model with no observation would
achieve 50% accuracy in categorizing user activity as PASS or FAIL according to
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each role-specific model. As in RQ1, we expect ID to outperform this random
baseline.
This task uses models independently. Specificity (i.e., 1 -FPR) and sensitivity
(i.e., recall) are statistical measures used for the performance of this classification
task. Both training and test data from the remaining three roles are used to evaluate
the model’s ability to reject uncharacteristic sequences (i.e., negative examples) by
measuring specificity. Only test data from the model’s own role is used to evaluate its
ability to accept valid sequences (i.e., positive examples) using sensitivity measures.
Additionally, we consider the affect of test sequence length on the performance of this
task by evaluating the number of keywords of an input sequence. Therefore, even
more test data for this task is obtained by separating user sessions into subsequences
of keywords of length two to length nine.
Finally, because we would like to track only a single threshold value for this
task even though sequence length varies, there is a compensation for the fact that
probability naturally tends to decrease as sequence length increases. In other words,
a threshold approach which might perform well for input sequences of length two
would likely overestimate the threshold for longer lengths. As an alternative, we
adapt the model’s output probability to be an indicator of entropy, a measure of
uncertainty in a system. This provides the ability to normalize by the length of the
input sequence. By doing so, a single threshold value for the binary classification
task is maintained. Binary classification results are show in Figure 4.16.
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(a) User n-gram model (b) Admin n-gram model.
(c) Technologist n-gram model. (d) Management n-gram model.
Figure 4.16: Role-based Binary Classification
RQ3 relates most directly to the CUA goal of ID. Efficient experimental results
are observed when accepting or rejecting snippets of user sessions based on role.
Each model was tested against every available subsequence of user keywords, from
lengths two to nine with a probability threshold of -0.6. Best performance was
observed when using N=9. Recall that backoff and smoothing in the model allow
for the assignment of probabilities to a sequence of any length, regardless of the
maximum history considered. Note that accuracy is plotted separately for positive
and negative test samples to analyze the models ability to reject uncharacteristic
sequences (i.e., specificity) and accept valid sequences (i.e., sensitivity).
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As expected, the length of sessions provided to models significantly affects the
ability to correctly classify the example. The effect of length was much greater on
negative examples, as failures due to rejecting a positive sample are rare after lengths
greater than four. The User model has the most sessions of activity and performs at a
level greater than 90% on all samples for lengths greater than three. When rejecting
uncharacteristic sequences, the Management model eventually achieved performance
of 92%, though this took sessions of length nine. With a 9% prevalence rate, it is
evident that this role needs more training/test data for the identification of outliers.
4.2 Discussion
It’s important to identify the prevalence of labeled data by determining how often
a particular label occurs in the dataset. The dataset under evaluation is heavily
populated with Tech-level keywords (approximately 59%). Therefore, the weighted
harmonic mean of precision and recall (i.e., f-measure) is highest for this particular
role at approximately 83% for each data split. For the multi-class approach, bi-
grams seem to have the most stability but its evident that more training data is
needed to reduce the false positive rate. We also conclude that individual user
identification requires less keywords and per-session data than role identification.
The parameters influencing the model grow exponentially with N and hence
a 5-gram model may not be practical in all cases. Having a larger value for N may
also require a larger training set since patterns tend to be more sparsely distributed
across keyword sessions. However, the parameters influencing a model, based on
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web logs, with a larger N value can be reduced by dropping high-frequency ‘noise’
such as Joint Expert Group (.jpg), Cascading Style Sheets (.css), JavaScript (.js),
Extensible Markup Language (.xml), and system generated text. Reducing this
‘noise’ gave us the ability to use a larger N value for the binary classification task.
However, we saw very little improvement for increased values of N when roles are
considered. From our results, one can conclude that binary classification proves
to be much more effective than a random baseline at detecting uncharacteristic
user behavior. Due to a large data set and elevated level of privileges for tasks, it
was expected that the Tech user role, for binary classification, would have one of
the strongest models but this was not observed. With the multi-class classification
approach, we observed below optimal classification rates for the User role model.
Conversely, the User model, in the binary approach, is stronger. This improvement
in performance could be due to the use of shorter sessions which are less likely to
contain unseen events. In this case, we rely on the validity of smoothing assumptions
for accurate probability estimation.
Throughout this study, it has been evident that many advantages and dis-
advantages exist for statistical language models. These machine learning models
contain flexible training and include test data that can be used to update execution
strategies. If appropriate training is available, our models are capable of detecting
malicious or unintended usage. In contrast, if relevant training is not available, poor
prediction performance is unavoidable. This approach is also highly dependent on
assumptions made by a system administrator. Therefore, detection performance can
be affected by slight changes in the keyword abstraction process.
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4.3 Threats to Validity
Intruder Detector is a user authentication tool that makes effective use of web logs
generated in a real-world setting. Keywords are captured over a period of three years.
Therefore, we train our n-gram classification models on realistic user behavior. We
attempt to limit the risk of over-fitting the model to specific sequences of training
data by selecting a diverse set of training examples for each test run. However,
threats to external, internal and construct validity still exist.
Threats to external validity. Threats to external validity are factors that
inhibit or reduce our ability to generalize our results. We validate our approach on
one web-based application, for which user behavior is abstracted into a model and
used to develop training and test sequences. Initially, the model was refined man-
ually, to identify keywords that are specific to user behavior (e.g., .jsp entries) for
this specific application. Some discrepancies may exist due to this action. If used in
a real-world setting, we expect system administrators to know enough about their
application to define instances in web log files that are indicative of user behavior.
However, we expect similar results for applications in this domain. We must note
that generalization beyond web-based organizational information system applica-
tions require additional experimentation and are not related to the results of this
research study.
Threats to internal validity. Threats to internal validity occur when alter-
native causes for experimental results are present. The dataset used has a large class
imbalance that may lead to an accuracy paradox for classification-based systems. We
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introduce several metrics to assess the performance of our approach to remedy this
concern. Since we use a real-world system with approximately 4000 registered users,
we were unable to provide active users with a list of tasks to perform. Therefore,
we depend on users to maintain consistency with their online behavior.
Threats to construct validity. Threats to construct validity are concerned
with the lack of compatibility or similarity between the concept measures used in
the study and the concepts intended to be measured. We use various performance
assessment techniques to understand the effectiveness of our approach. However,
metrics used to evaluate user behavior in this study may not be useful metrics in
other domains using the same CUA technique.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we presented an empirical evaluation of CUA for web-based orga-
nizational information system applications. We answered three research questions
with a custom set of evaluation metrics. Below is a high-level summary of our
results:
• RQ1: Role-based identification. Roles with the best f-measure performed
at 82% and approximately 10% FPR with bi-gram models. Overall, models
with more per-session data have higher precision rates and models with more
keyword data have higher recall rates. Training data plays a huge role in
obtaining an accurate result.
• RQ2: User-based identification. The role of each individual user has a signif-
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icant impact on user identification. Users that generated the most keywords
have the best f-measure at 88% and approximately 10% FPR. Overall, the
FPR is lower for these models when compared to role-based models.
• RQ3: Identification of outliers. From these experiments, binary classification
has the most promising results. Overall, we obtain above 90% accuracy when
accepting positive data and rejecting uncharacteristic data. Models with a
larger set of keyword data reject uncharacteristic data at a lower rate than
models with smaller sets of keyword data. Additionally, models that have
more training sessions reject negative data at a rate greater than 80%.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions
In this chapter, we present an overview of our research and discuss various oppor-
tunities for future work.
5.1 Research Overview
Many organizations are becoming increasingly aware of their security posture. It’s
important to identify cybersecurity-related risks and develop strategies to mitigate
them. Continuous user authentication is one approach that can be utilized to iden-
tify impersonations and misappropriation of authentication credentials [61]. Specif-
ically, this technique can be used with web applications to provide reliable and
secure authentication. In this work, we present challenges that occur when model-
ing the behavior of users that interact with web-based software. We then present
an approach to address the need for web-based continuous user authentication.
We obtain less than optimal results when conducting a feasibility study, us-
ing a real-world application, to assess the need for our approach. After exploring
various statistical language models, we employ the use of n-grams to capture user
interaction with web-based software. We use n-grams to model sequences and sub-
sequences of user actions, their orderings, and the temporal relationships that make
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them unique. After learning the behavior, we illustrate the ability to classify the
models using multi-class classification to identify role and/or individual user charac-
teristics. Results show model-specific differences in user behavior with performance
highly dependent on session and keyword size. We identify outliers in variable-
length keyword sequences using the binary classification technique. Results from
this approach show the rate at which each model rejects uncharacteristic sequences
and accepts valid sequences. Our CUA implementation is continual, non-intrusive,
and behavioral.
In summary, the contributions of this research include the following:
• We develop a novel keyword abstraction technique to pre-process large volumes
of web logs. This method helps reduce incomplete, noisy, and inconsistent
data.
• We explore various statistical language models to capture the behavior of users
as they interact with web-based organizational information systems.
• We develop a continuous user authentication framework, based on n-grams,
to classify user sessions into roles and individual usage profiles. We also use
this approach to identify outliers in role-based user behavior.
• We introduce a set of evaluation metrics to test the feasibility of our approach.
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5.2 Future Work
Our work in continuous user authentication is a foundational approach for web-
based user behavioral analysis. There are various ways our work can be extended
to explore this research domain. We conclude that with two of the four role-based
models considered, the correct identification of negative samples was above 90% as
well as a 100% correct acceptance of positive samples. These findings are promising,
and motivate future work to better understand model-specific differences which make
this task more difficult for some cases (e.g., Admin and Technologist roles) than
others. In particular, the finding that User sessions can so easily be protected
against uncharacteristic usage is promising.
Many web applications have different sensitivity levels for security threats.
Some systems must be protected at higher levels than other systems. There is
a need to investigate an adaptive scheme (i.e., tunable parameter) to determine
thresholds for different applications. The thresholds may be adjusted based on a
user’s role, application infrastructure, business logic, usage patterns, etc.
In many settings, statistical language models are computationally intensive.
Building n-grams over large datasets pose challenges to memory and speed [62].
The computational cost of running these models should be calculated in real time
to access the current usability performance. There may be a need to utilize a high
performance computing environment to increase prediction time in an effort to help
prevent or interrupt malicious web use. It will be useful to explore parallelization on
various platforms such as shared memory processor machines and Linux clusters with
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a high-speed network. Instead of starting with a parallel programming framework
such as MPI or OpenMP, many standard tools exist. Parallelization scripts from
the IRST Language Modeling Toolkit are an acceptable starting point to distribute
tasks to a cluster of machines [63].
There are various performance metrics available for classification tasks. The
performance metrics used in this work can be extended to include the time it takes
to identify legitimate and malicious use. When outliers are identified, it’s important
to detect this activity before the active session is complete. However, in some cases,
this time metric may allow some flexibility to help application forensics analyst
gather reliable evidence to use against perpetrators.
A combination of machine learning techniques for classification should be ex-
plored for continuous user authentication. In this research, we use supervised learn-
ing techniques to access the classification of user behavior. Exploring how semi-
supervised and unsupervised learning help make data-driven predictions or decisions
is an open area of research in this domain.
Finally, our work uses a single modality for CUA tasks. The use of a multi-
modal approach may prove to provide a more transparent authentication process
and help reduce false positive rates. Even though our models are able to detect
legitimate users and outliers, the false alarms can be annoying and decrease usability
dramatically. For example, a combination of web logs, database logs, and graphical
user interface (GUI) accesses can be used to obtain more information about a user’s
behavior. Keyboard and mouse interactions may also be integrated to provide a cost-
effective solution for continuous authentication. At any time, when one modality
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is not available, another one is able to capture such behavior and provide a highly
predictive system.
In summary, in this dissertation, we have shown how sequences and subse-
quences of user interactions are captured within statistical language models to con-
tinuously identify users, user types, and outliers in user behavior. To provide fo-
cus, we have limited our research to web-based organizational information systems.
However, the CUA domain can be extended to context-aware computing, Internet
of Things (IoT), and people-centric applications.
87
Bibliography
[1] Richard P. Guidorizzi. Security: Active authentication. IT Professional,
15(4):4–7, 2013.
[2] SplashData. Splashdata news, 2015. [Online; accessed 03-October-2015].
[3] Koichiro Niinuma, Anil K. Jain, Jain B.V.K.V Kumar, S. Prabhakar, and A. A.
Ross. Continuous user authentication using temporal information. SPIE., 7667,
2010.
[4] Animesh Patcha and Jung-Min Park. An overview of anomaly detection tech-
niques: Existing solutions and latest technological trends. Comput. Netw.,
51(12):3448–3470, August 2007.
[5] Koichiro Niinuma, Unsang Park, and Anil K. Jain. Soft biometric traits for
continuous user authentication. Trans. Info. For. Sec., 5(4):771–780, December
2010.
[6] DARPA. Active authentication: http://www.darpa.mil/program/active-
authentication, 2013. [Online; accessed 24-November-2015].
[7] Chao Shen, Zhongmin Cai, and Xiaohong Guan. Continuous authentication
for mouse dynamics: A pattern-growth approach. In Proceedings of the 2012
42Nd Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and
Networks (DSN), DSN ’12, pages 1–12, Washington, DC, USA, 2012. IEEE
Computer Society.
[8] Fabian Monrose and Aviel D. Rubin. Keystroke dynamics as a biometric for
authentication. Future Gener. Comput. Syst., 16(4):351–359, February 2000.
[9] Information System. Information system, 2015. [Online; accessed 03-October-
2015].
88
[10] Leslie Milton, Bryan Robbins, and Atif Memon. N-gram based user behavioral
model for continuous user authentication. In The Proceedings of the Eighth In-
ternational Conference on Emerging Security Information, Systems, and Tech-
nologies (SECURWARE 2014), 2014.
[11] Daniel Jurafsky and James Martin. Speech and Language Processing: An Intro-
duction to Natural Language Processing, Computational Linguistics, and Speech
Recognition. Pearson Prentice Hall, 2nd edition, 2009.
[12] Yubico. Yubico. http://www.yubico.com/, 2013. [Online; accessed 1-November-
2013].
[13] Dino Schweitzer, Jeff Boleng, Colin Hughes, and Louis Murphy. Visualizing
keyboard pattern passwords. Information Visualization, 10(2):127–133, April
2011.
[14] Andrew J. Klosterman and Gregory R. Ganger. Secure continuous biometric-
enhanced authentication. Technical report, Carnegie Mellon Univ., May 2000.
[15] Michael Kaminsky, George Savvides, David Mazieres, and M. Frans Kaashoek.
Decentralized user authentication in a global file system. In Proceedings of
the Nineteenth ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, SOSP ’03,
pages 60–73, New York, NY, USA, 2003. ACM.
[16] Richard Chow, Markus Jakobsson, Ryusuke Masuoka, Jesus Molina, Yuan Niu,
Elaine Shi, and Zhexuan Song. Authentication in the clouds: A framework and
its application to mobile users. In Proceedings of the 2010 ACM Workshop on
Cloud Computing Security Workshop, CCSW ’10, pages 1–6, New York, NY,
USA, 2010. ACM.
[17] The Wall Street Journal. U.s. suspects hackers in china breached about 4 mil-
lion people’s records, officials say: http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-suspects-
hackers-in-china-behind-government-data-breach-sources-say-1433451888,
2015. [Online; accessed 17-November-2015].
[18] Eric Grosse and Mayank Upadhyay. Authentication at scale. IEEE Security
and Privacy, 11:15–22, 2013.
[19] I. Deutschmann, P. Nordstrom, and L. Nilsson. Continuous authentication
using behavioral biometrics. IT Professional, 15(4):12–15, July 2013.
[20] Harini Jagadeesan and Michael S. Hsiao. Continuous authentication in comput-
ers. Continuous Authentication using Biometrics: Data, Models, and Metrics,
1:40–66, 2012.
[21] Alphan Altinok and Matthew Turk. Temporal integration for continuous multi-
modal biometrics. In In Multimodal User Authentication, pages 131–137, 2003.
89
[22] Hang-Bong Kang and Myung-Ho Ju. Multi-modal feature integration for secure
authentication. In Proceedings of the 2006 International Conference on Intelli-
gent Computing - Volume Part I, ICIC’06, pages 1191–1200, Berlin, Heidelberg,
2006. Springer-Verlag.
[23] Yinglian Xie, Fang Yu, Qifa Ke, Martin Abadi, Eliot Gillum, Krish Vitalde-
varia, Jason Walter, Junxian Huang, and Zhuoqing Morley Mao. Innocent by
association: Early recognition of legitimate users. In Proceedings of the 2012
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS ’12, pages
353–364, New York, NY, USA, 2012. ACM.
[24] Pang Wu, Joy Zhang, Jiang Zhu, and Xiao Wang. Sensec: Mobile security
through passive sensing. In Proceedings of the 2013 International Conference on
Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC), ICNC ’13, pages 1128–
1133, Washington, DC, USA, 2013. IEEE Computer Society.
[25] Hataichanok Saevanee, Nathan Clarke, Steven Furnell, and Valerio Biscione.
Continuous user authentication using multi-modal biometrics. Computers and
Security, 53:234 – 246, 2015.
[26] Tee Kiah Chia, Khe Chai Sim, Haizhou Li, and Hwee Tou Ng. Statistical
lattice-based spoken document retrieval. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst., 28(1):2:1–
2:30, January 2010.
[27] Jay M. Ponte and W. Bruce Croft. A language modeling approach to infor-
mation retrieval. In Proceedings of the 21st Annual International ACM SIGIR
Conference on Research and Development in Information Retrieval, SIGIR ’98,
pages 275–281, New York, NY, USA, 1998. ACM.
[28] Deyi Xiong, Min Zhang, and Haizhou Li. Enhancing language models in sta-
tistical machine translation with backward n-grams and mutual information
triggers. In Proceedings of the 49th Annual Meeting of the Association for
Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies - Volume 1, HLT
’11, pages 1288–1297, Stroudsburg, PA, USA, 2011. Association for Computa-
tional Linguistics.
[29] Michael Collins, Brian Roark, and Murat Saraclar. Discriminative syntactic
language modeling for speech recognition. In Proceedings of the 43rd Annual
Meeting on Association for Computational Linguistics, ACL ’05, pages 507–514,
Stroudsburg, PA, USA, 2005. Association for Computational Linguistics.
[30] Ronald Rosenfeld. Two decades of statistical language modeling: Where do we
go from here. In Proceedings of the IEEE, page 2000, 2000.
[31] M. Egmont-Petersen, D. de Ridder, and H. Handels. Image processing with
neural networksa review. Pattern Recognition, 35(10):2279 – 2301, 2002.
90
[32] Adam Fadlalla and Chien-Hua Lin. An analysis of the applications of neural
networks in finance. Interfaces, 31(4):112–122, July 2001.
[33] MariaGraa Ruano and AntnioE. Ruano. On the use of artificial neural net-
works for biomedical applications. In Valentina Emilia Balas, Jnos Fodor,
Annamria R. Vrkonyi-Kczy, Joszef Dombi, and Lakhmi C. Jain, editors, Soft
Computing Applications, volume 195 of Advances in Intelligent Systems and
Computing, pages 433–451. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013.
[34] H Larochelle, Y. Bengio, J. Louradour, and P. Lamblin. Exploring strategies for
training deep neural networks. J. Machine Learning Research, 10:1–40, 2009.
[35] Rajendra Akerkar and Priti Sajja. Knowledge-Based Systems. Jones and
Bartlett Publishers, Inc., USA, 1st edition, 2009.
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